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Managing the Social Impacts of Austerity Britain: 
The Cultural Politics of Neo-Liberal ‘nudging’ 
 
Emma L. Briant and Steven Harkins 
 
 
Neo-liberalism, Policymaking and Social Interventionism 
 
The global collapse of the financial sector in 2007–2008 led to criticism of neo-liberal 
economic policy and calls for a return to Keynesianism (Wolf, 2008). Yet the political 
response to the most recent financial crisis has been an austerity drive, targeted at the welfare 
state; this approach can be understood as a continuation of the neo-liberal project to roll-back 
the state.  It was a similar period of crisis following the end of the ‘golden age of capitalism’ 
and the dissolution of the Post-War compromise between capital and labour (Marglin and 
Schor, 1992; Dumeneil and Levy, 2004; Harvey, 2005, 22) that ushered in the development 
of neo-liberalism in the 1970s.  
 
Neo-liberalism emerged from the ideas of a ‘thought collective’, the Mont Pelerin Society, 
who hosted an intellectual movement that attempted to counter the Keynesian collectivist 
policies that had emerged from the post-war settlement, and had subsequently led to the 
creation of the welfare state (Cockett, 1995; Harvey, 2005; Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009). 
Economists associated with the society, particularly classical Liberals like Ludwig von 
Mises, and Friedrich von Hayek, constructed the state as a tyrannical and oppressive force, 
which interferes with the liberty of free individuals (Hall, 2012: 11).  
 
2 
This radical individualism remained on the fringes of political discourse until the collapse of 
economic growth in the 1970s which left Britain indebted to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and committed to a requirement for deep public spending cuts (Burk, 1992). This 
crisis undermined Keynesianism as an economic model and neo-liberal ideas came to 
dominate the policies of the Margaret Thatcher’s Government (1979–1990). Critics of neo-
liberalism have described it as a reaction by the ‘upper classes’ who ‘felt threatened’ by the 
collapse of growth and moved to secure their interests (Harvey, 2005: 16). Neo-liberalism in 
Britain principally aimed, over three decades, to cut back the ‘social-democratic welfare 
state’ which was seen as the ‘arch enemy of freedom’ because it interferes with the ‘natural’ 
mechanisms of the market (Hall, 2012: 9–11). The first phase of this project, implemented 
between 1979 and 1986, involved deep cuts and restrictions in public spending, culminating 
in the deregulation of the City of London (Hills, 1998: 2; Scott-Samuel et. al., 2014: 54). 
 
These reforms have led to increased economic inequality, which has been linked to a range of 
social problems (Thomas, Dorling and Smith, 2010; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). A sharp 
rise in unemployment throughout this period was linked to rising crime (Davies, 1997: 240). 
Benefit cuts led to an increase in homelessness, especially amongst teenagers (Scott-Samuel 
et. al., 2014: 55), which was worsened by the subsequent reduction of social housing stock 
through privatization. The development of these social problems led to a paradox in neo-
liberal thinking and realization among the political and intellectual elite that ‘less 
government’ led to a need to ‘mask and contain the deleterious social consequences’ of 
rolling-back the state (Wacquant, 1999: 323). The savings that were supposed to be made in 
public expenditure failed to materialize as the number of pensioners, lone parent families and 
unemployed people increased (Hills, 1998: 4). A ‘socially interventionist’ agenda developed 
which involved targeting a series of reforms aimed to ensure that, ‘As many costs as possible 
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should be shifted from the state and back onto individuals, and markets, particularly labour 
markets, [which] should be as flexible as possible’ (Gamble, 2001: 131–132). Peck and 
Tickell called this response an ‘aggressive re-regulation, disciplining, and containment of 
those marginalised or dispossessed’ (2002: 389).  
 
Criticism from the government was directed at ‘people who make themselves homeless by 
moving from their home area’ (Franklin, 1999: 111). Thatcher criticized the attitude of 
homeless people, arguing that their attitude was, ‘I am homeless, the Government must house 
me!’, and 
 
they are casting their problems on society and who is society? There is no such 
thing! There are individual men and women and there are families and no 
government can do anything except through people and people look to 
themselves first (1987). 
 
This blaming of individuals for policy failings continued with John Major’s ‘back to basics’ 
campaign following his election in 1992.  During this time the emerging ‘underclass’ theory 
was embraced by leading Conservative Party figures including Michael Portillo, John 
Redwood and Peter Lilley who argued that single mothers were an economic burden on 
society (Lund, 2008: 46). Local authorities enforced co-habitation rules for single mothers 
that meant sometimes they were forced to live with violent ex-partners and did not provide 
the infrastructure needed for their independence (Campbell, 1984: 28). Political and media 
rhetoric constructed them as both burden and threat to society because of their ‘likely to be 
criminal’ children (Silva, 1996: 178). Electoral support for the Conservatives dropped sharply 
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after 1993 and some commentators blamed these policies for creating an image of the ‘nasty 
party’ that brought electoral defeat (Hasan, 2010). 
 
The 1997 election ended eighteen years of Conservative governance, but ‘New Labour’ had 
embraced neo-liberal welfare reform policies that similarly emphasized individual 
responsibility. Prime Minister Tony Blair argued that the welfare state inherited from the 
Conservatives was still 
 
weighted heavily towards rewarding and supporting people who were not actively 
seeking to improve their situation, whether by looking for work or by taking part 
in training (Marston, 2008: 363). 
 
Between 2004–2005 Blair sought to bring in cuts to the number of incapacity benefit 
claimants in what was a long-term issue dating back to the social impact of privatization and 
the lasting effects of the ‘roll-back’ of the state in the 1980s (Beatty and Fothergill, 2010). 
Rising numbers of unemployed people had also been encouraged onto incapacity benefit in 
an effort to reduce the unemployment figures (ibid.). Labour’s binary discourse separated 
deserving taxpayers from undeserving benefit recipients and invoked ‘the idea that ordinary 
taxpayers have a lot to fear from a large-group of “welfare dependent” spongers’ (Marston 
2008: 364). They brought in a number of corresponding policy adjustments including 
reductions in welfare spending in the early years of New Labour’s administration (Hills, 
1998: 23), however this period also brought the creation of the minimum wage, the New 
Deal, and a package of redistributive tax policies like Working Tax Credit. This welfare 
spending was targeted at ‘deserving’ groups like children, those in work and pensioners, 
meanwhile cuts were targeted in other areas (Brewer et. al., 2002) like unemployment and 
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disability. These early initiatives were followed by a second phase of welfare reform focused 
on a ‘gradual escalation in the requirements asked of benefit recipients’ specifically targeted 
at  ‘lone parents, and the sick and disabled’ (Brewer, 2007: 26). 
 
Despite Labour’s tough stance on welfare, in 2010 Coalition Work and Pensions secretary 
Iain Duncan Smith again argued that his government had inherited a ‘broken system’ from 
Labour where people were ‘parked’ on benefits (Press Association, 2010). This focus on 
welfare cuts in Britain was echoed on a global scale following the economic crisis. The 
OECD’s solution to the crisis recommended a reduction of what was described as the 
‘burgeoning welfare burden’ and issued advice to countries, for instance, to ‘activate existing 
disability benefit recipients’ who were argued to be an obstacle to raising labour force 
participation rates and a major contributor to public expenditure (2009: 5–9). Britain’s 
Coalition Government made welfare reform a central aim and sought to impose new financial 
regimes based firmly in long-established precepts of neo-liberal economics. 
    
Despite unprecedented transfer to the wealthiest citizens and bonuses to the banks (Bennett, 
2014), austerity policies were targeted at benefit recipients, by definition the poorest 
members of society, and it is they who were claimed to be impeding global recovery. Paul 
Krugman argues that opposition to capitalism lost its impetus after the collapse of socialism 
as an ideology, which has led to a tacit acceptance of inequality, unemployment and injustice 
as ‘unpleasant aspects’ of the system which are ‘accepted as facts of life’ (2009: 14). His 
words depressingly echoed Margaret Thatcher’s famous maxim that ‘there is no alternative’. 
The lack of political dissent at this narrative highlights how ‘after forty years of a concerted 
neo-liberal ideological assault, this new version of common sense is fast becoming the 
dominant one’ if indeed we can describe it as ‘new’ (Hall and O’Shea, 2013: 4).  
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In the next section we will highlight some actions that constructed and supported this 
ideology after the crisis. We revisit Gramsci’s concept of hegemony which can help in 
understanding why and how the ‘common-sense’ ideology of personal rather than state 
responsibility was supported in media coverage. The mainstream media coverage 
complemented the government’s ideological and policy apparatus in endorsing claims that 
benefit recipients were impeding global recovery and justifying massive reforms and a new 
wave of social interventionism. 
 
Cultural Hegemony, Social Interventionism and ‘Nudging’ 
 
Hegemony, for Gramsci, emerges through various competing ideologies, some of which are 
theories created by ‘traditional’ intellectuals - academics or political activists, others are more 
‘organic’ emerging within people’s lived experience and articulated through religion, 
education, family, and the media. At this popular level ‘common sense’ and ‘good sense’ are 
developed as a form of practical philosophy (1971: 328). But different groups and their 
ideologies develop in a way that resolves tensions between dominant and subordinate groups. 
Essentially for Gramsci this tension was necessary for the coordination of ‘the dominant 
group’ with ‘the general interests of the subordinate groups’ so that the state could modify 
any ‘unstable equilibria’ of interests (ibid: 182). Contemporary austerity has been supported 
by state interventionism which attempts to build personal responsibility, and deflect the 
responsibility away from government and the failures of capitalism. But ideological 
adjustments are necessary to build acceptance from groups whose interests may conflict, 
structuring and presenting policy in such a way that it appears to meet the needs of all. 
Gramsci saw some scope for resistance and ‘will’ in what he called ‘organic intellectuals’ 
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(ibid: 129), but this exists alongside their tendency to shape perceptions of institutions and 
wider society according to the dominant culture. Attention placed on the financial system or 
state responsibility through ‘organic’ discourses in the media needed to be managed by 
offering minimal adjustments whilst ensuring the overall continuation of the hegemonic 
system. One such system for these minimal adjustments was BIT, discussed below.1 This 
underpinned, for Gramsci, the appearance that dominant interests were the same as those of 
wider society and that government was ‘based on the consent of the majority’ as expressed 
through the media (ibid: 80). Gramsci articulated a theory of how the dominant group are 
able to manufacture consent and consensus in society, whilst allowing conflicts to be resolved 
or absorbed. Much of his theory is helpful in considering the way that democracies work 
today and how the dominance of neo-liberal ideology is maintained, both within the state and 
in its relation to civil society and the British public.   
 
For Gramsci, the traditional intellectuals and ‘party’ reproduced most closely the dominant 
order. During the recent ‘crisis’ of capitalism a team was established within government to 
build ideological change through modifying behaviour. The BIT (mentioned above) would 
initiate ‘interventions’ across government by structuring behaviour modification into British 
policy-making in service of the government’s wider policies to reduce the state and refocus 
on ‘personal responsibility’. The unit was set up by its Director, David Halpern, following the 
2010 election around the principles of behavioural economics and the psychology of 
behaviour change.  
 
                                               
1 The ‘Behavioural Insights Team’ (BIT) is often articulated as a rejection of classical economics in 
favour of the more socially sustainable approach of behavioural economics. These strategies, 
originally developed by New Labour (Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit 2004) were taken up within 
the Coalition’s austerity drive and so that responsibility for social problems could be shifted 
onto individuals, reducing the role of the state, they aim to use knowledge of natural 
psychological biases and errors to modify behaviour. 
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It is instructive to examine the ‘Mindspace’ report - an early vision commissioned by Gus 
O’Donnell, the Cabinet Secretary under New Labour, which became central to BIT planning.2 
Mindspace states that behavioural approaches offer new ‘potentially powerful’ tools that are 
‘especially relevant in a period of fiscal restraint’ (Dolan et. al., 2010: 7). Far from 
transforming the neo-liberal capitalist ideology identified above, behavioural economics was 
harnessed for ‘shaping individual behaviour’ around these goals instead of using ‘legal and 
regulatory systems’ (ibid: 13). The Mindspace report anticipates that ‘fiscal challenges may 
sharpen interest in behaviour change further, as policymakers and public service 
professionals wrestle with the challenge of how to achieve “more with less”’ (ibid:12–13). It 
is unsurprising then that while the ideas were brewing under Labour they were really seized 
upon by the Conservative-led Coalition as a way to facilitate cuts while moderating social 
impact in a way that shifted the burden away from the state. BIT really took off after the 
financial crisis, which,  
 
created the conditions under which people … suddenly became much more 
interested in it … because a lot of the behavioural suggestions were ones that 
could be incorporated in a period when basically you’re trying to run the public 
sector with no  new money (O’Donnell, 2014).3 
 
The interventions ‘tended to be cheap … so in a world when you haven’t got any more 
money… suddenly behavioural ideas are very attractive’ to government policy makers. 
                                               
2 An economist, Gus O’Donnell had overseen implementation of many of the neo-liberal policies 
mentioned above that contributed to widening inequality in the UK. From 2002 to 2005 he was 
Permanent Secretary at HM Treasury; then became Cabinet Secretary until 2011.  
3 Gus O’Donnell had formerly been the United Kingdom's Executive Director to both the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank (1997–8), then the Treasury Director of Macroeconomic Policy and 
Prospects and Head of the Government Economics Service - with overall responsibility for professional 
government economists. From 1999 to 2002 as Managing Director of Macroeconomic Policy and International 
Finance he was made responsible for the UK’s fiscal policy, international development and EMU. As a lecturer 
at Glasgow University, one of his specialisms for teaching was ‘welfare economics’ (O’Donnell June 25 2014). 
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(ibid.). In planning for BIT, O’Donnell was motivated by his experience with the ‘IMF and 
its response to the Asian financial crisis’ he felt ‘the kinds of suggestions being put forward 
were very much taken from an economic textbook and they didn’t really account for the 
political economy and the way people would feel … and how they’d respond’ (ibid.). 
Traditional economic models assume citizens can analyse information to decide what is in 
their interest before acting, according to rational economic self-interest. Behavioural 
economics originated in 1970s United States, partly in response to neo-liberalism. 
Psychologists such as Herbert Simon noted that the suppo ed ‘rationality’ of human 
behaviour which these theories assumed was ‘bounded’ by effective intuition. For Simon, 
behaviour was far more complex than economic reductionism could admit and we should 
therefore study ‘real people’ in real-world contexts (1945; 1957). This ‘old behavioural 
economics’ was developed into its contemporary form by psychologists Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky (1974) and later, Richard Thaler. O’Donnell had been interested in these 
ideas since he was a student at Nuffield College, Oxford when he recalled ‘working with … 
Ian Little and Jim Mirrlees who were very interested in ways of handling situations where 
markets didn’t work well, where prices were distorted and how in such cases you might come 
up with better decisions’ (O’Donnell, 2014). But O’Donnell saw the focus of media discourse 
on behavioural economics as misleading due to BIT’s social and public policy focus: 
 
it’s very deliberately called behavioural insights team … because the whole point 
is that in a sense this is a failing in economics and the people who have done … 
very useful work on decision making are psychologists … social scientists … and 
now neuroscientists’ (ibid.). 
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The Mindspace model draws on the notion that people’s behaviour is frequently also shaped 
by more ‘automatic’ or unconscious ‘contextual’ factors and proposes utilizing psychology to 
influence these – to cause a desired behaviour without awareness or conscious decision being 
necessary (Dolan et. al., 2010: 14). Mindspace states that ‘not all government 
communications focus on simple information provision; often they draw on more 
sophisticated techniques of persuasion’ (ibid: 15). An important component is the design of 
communications, but nudging goes beyond this, to modify the ‘choice architecture’ – the 
circumstances in which behaviours happen and decisions to act are made (Sunstein and 
Thaler, 2008). Mindspace says that once an individual has been encouraged to make a small 
adjustment to their behaviour ‘the powerful desire to act consistently takes over’ and this 
means ‘subsequent changes in behaviour … may go largely unnoticed’ (Dolan et. al., 2010: 
28).  
 
Mindspace states that its effects need to be combined with ‘a nuanced understanding of the 
capabilities and motivations of the target audience’ (ibid.).4 Theory at the heart of Mindspace 
is drawn from classic work in psychology which has formed the core of commercial 
marketing strategies, e.g., (Gilovich et. al., 2002). ‘Required reading’ for Conservative MPs 
in 2008, the book Nudge by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) and the propaganda book Influence: 
The Psychology of Persuasion by Robert Cialdini (2007) have been central to Mindspace and 
BIT (where US Professor Richard Thaler is an advisor). These theories form the core of a 
detailed propaganda strategy and approach to social policy that, propelled by austerity, is 
influencing policy planning nationally and, increasingly, internationally.  
 
                                               
4 Therefore to be effective psychological profiling would be needed to successfully hape an intervention for a 
specific target, at a time when increasingly government information gathering and privacy issues are of strong 
public concern. 
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The New Economics Foundation (NEF) is a think tank pushing, for among other things, a 
move away from neo-classical economics but they see behavioural economics as an 
acceptable alternative (Shah and Dawney, 2005). This wider ‘libertarian paternalist’ approach 
which the Coalition Government were ‘embedding into its broader gestalt’ by rolling out BIT 
in fact ‘represents an important set of challenges to the hegemonic assumptions of neo-
liberalism, which have held sway since the rise of Thatcherism’ (Whitehead et. al., 2012: 
302). There was indeed resistance from some people in government, ‘who had grown up with 
a certain way of thinking about [economics and] had got the traditional economic model [in 
their heads. They] were… saying “it’s all about prices” … there was a bit of an old guard 
around who found new ways of thinking difficult’ (O’Donnell, 2014). Think Tanks are 
slowly embracing behaviour change.5 Among them, O’Donnell mentioned NEF and that 
‘interestingly the regulators’ were taking it up: the, ‘Financial Conduct Authority… now 
starting to put out publications on how they’re using behavioural economics. It’s a massively 
growing area’ (O’Donnell, 2014). The Institute of Fiscal Studies think tank also supports 
behavioural approaches, to inform and complement existing policy, see (Leicester, Levell and 
Rasul, 2012). Behavioural economics is an effort to ‘fix’ the unpredictability and perceived 
‘errors’ of human behaviour in relation to market expectations and as such is not actually to 
challenge neo-liberal policy. 
 
While the idea of government ‘interventions’ runs counter to free market principles, in reality 
the latter never existed unmediated in the UK. This has led to a ‘growing realisation that 
market-based forms of coordination have proved detrimental to long-term social, economic 
and ecological stability’ (Whitehead et. al., 2012: 303). As detailed above, ‘social 
                                               
5
 Nigel Oakes founder of behaviour change defence contractor Strategic Communication Laboratories and the 
Behavioural Dynamics Institute said ‘the key people from the behavioural nudge unit all came to see us [at 
SCL/BDI] ...when it was in its infancy … to see how they could ... shape it.’ He described how they also 
‘worked with [BIT] in the past ... briefed them on a number of occasions’ as they were growing (Oakes 2013). 
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interventionism’ has been necessary to mediate the negative social impact of austerity. As 
Robert Gilpin argues, in a capitalist system, it is, 
 
important that leadership ensure at least minimal safeguards for the inevitable 
losers from market forces and from the process of creative destruction; those who 
lose must at least believe that the system functions fairly (2000: 4).  
 
Cheap ‘policy solutions’ like BIT and individualist rhetoric act as a pressure valve to prevent 
social impacts from becoming so severe they threaten the stability of the state. This new 
behavioural economics views ‘the human subject as a target of correctional re-rationalisation’ 
(Whitehead et. al., 2012: 305). Other academic work, e.g., Thrift (2007) points to other 
possible conclusions, that we should work with ‘the vibrant unpredictability of life and 
human development’ seeing this complexity as positive and essential to humanity even 
though it may raise problems for government planning (Whitehead et. al., 2012: 305). 
Discussions around behavioural change are dominated by psychologists, neuroscientists, 
political scientists and economists, and at the House of Lords Behaviour Change Inquiry in 
2011, Whitehead et. al., felt the emphasis was on efficacy and there was no opportunity to ask 
normative questions (2012: 305). 
 
Mindspace rightly notes that ‘government influences behaviour no matter what it does’ 
(Dolan et. al., 2010; 16) and as such has a responsibility to consider the possible direct and 
indirect influences its activities and communications might have in a real-world context to 
ensure this serves the public interest. The report explicitly states that the practice of 
behaviour change might require ‘careful handling’ and that ‘the public need to give 
permission and help shape how such tools are used’ (ibid: 10). It considers ‘issues around 
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gaining democratic permission for behaviour change policies’ listing the three key factors to 
consider: ‘who the policy affects; what type of behaviour is intended; how the change will be 
accomplished’ (ibid.). Whose behaviour is to be modified, is an important political issue and 
one which will be central to the analysis hereon. It is important to examine the political 
contexts in which these strategies are and are not applied.  
 
As mentioned above, one social impact of neo-liberal policies in the 1990s was a rise in 
crime. Initial foci detailed in the early Mindspace report included ‘safer communities’, where 
interventions were designed to deal with this (largely poverty-related) crime; ‘the good 
society’ (which includes encouraging individuals’ pro-environmental behaviours and 
‘responsible parenting’); and creating ‘healthy and prosperous lives’ – prophetic at a time of 
National Health Service (NHS) privatization (ibid: 29). BIT’s support to the civil service 
includes initiatives for government bodies such as Public Health England, a new agency 
charged with supporting public health after the shake-up of the NHS last year. It has been 
criticized by medical organizations including the British Medical Association for not being 
independent enough to contradict changes to government policy (Campbell, 2014). But BIT 
has been involved in interventions cross-government, and ‘are now active in almost every 
area of domestic policy’ (Service, 2013). The recent ‘priority areas’ include ‘giving of time 
and money’, ‘public service reform’ and ‘reducing regulation’. Due to initial resistance, BIT 
‘had to … prove it was worth the money in setting it up … to win over the sceptics. What 
[Halpern] did first of all was to implement some initiatives which showed [the] small unit 
[had] come up with some ideas that saved vast multiples of what you’ve spent’ (O’Donnell, 
2014). They claim to have saved £300m between 2010 and 2012, twenty times BIT’s cost. 
This was largely through drawing forward income tax by appealing to the conformist urges of 
already-largely-compliant late payers to pay sooner (Benjamin, 2013).  
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The focus according to O’Donnell was on ‘those who were making bad mistakes and that 
could range across the income span, so people with rather a lot of money were making very 
stupid decisions … on terms of which [annuity] to buy for example …’ (O’Donnell,  2014). 
But the Mindspace report states that ‘someone who has developed a dislike of government 
interventions may be less likely to listen to messages that they perceived to come from “the 
government”’ (Dolan et. al., 2010: 19). And regarding this it specifically emphasizes how 
‘those from the lower socioeconomic groups are more sensitive to the characteristics of the 
messenger’ and this may make them resistant to targeting attempts at ‘addressing 
inequalities’ (ibid.). The report states that ‘we may irrationally discard advice given by 
someone we dislike’ and ‘the most effective strategy for changing behaviour may be to use 
third parties or downplay government involvement in a campaign or intervention’ (ibid.). 
This raises a conflict with the stated need to ‘gain democratic permission’ for the use of these 
behavioural methodologies. Thaler and Sunstein also argue transparency and publicity are 
essential in nudging (2007: 244). Wilkinson calls this an ‘escape clause’ to stop nudges being 
manipulative and ensure they preserve an individual’s liberty to choose, it means they can 
‘opt-out’ of nudges they dislike or that are designed poorly (2012: 351). On this BIT’s 
Deputy Director Owain Service said, ‘We obviously work with Richard [Thaler] a lot and we 
know Cass [Sunstein] very well as well, and ... our starting position is … what the best way 
of achieving a given objective is. So, we don’t sort of ruthlessly apply that ... libertarian 
paternalistic approach.’ He added, ‘I don't think ... if you talk to Richard ... I don't think he 
would religiously apply that philosophy either’ (Service, 2013).  
 
The suffocation of differing agendas in propaganda, and in the decision-making process, so 
that conflicts of interest remain unseen, is a way power can be exercised over a person ‘by 
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influencing, shaping and determining his very wants’ (Lukes, 2005: 27). Behavioural 
propaganda in particular often aims to produce ‘consent’ (Gramsci, 1971), by engineering the 
situation whereby people will produce the ‘right’ behaviour without their rational awareness 
that they are being influenced. Steven Lukes observes how non-decision-making is a crucial 
element of power analysis (2005: 22– 3). 
 
Mindspace further states that campaigns designed to provide information and allow for 
choice may be effective among the privileged but less effective among those disadvantaged 
in society. It argues that relying on the latter group making what are thought of as the 
‘rational’ decisions about their interests is problematic and would lead to a behaviour change 
gap: 
 
‘the better educated, higher income, more advantaged minds are the first and 
easiest minds to change, inequalities in health and wellbeing may be widened by 
information campaigns.’ (Dolan, et. al., 2010: 15). 
 
Instead Mindspace proposes an ‘Automatic System’ that influences the ‘context’ in which all 
people act. By this rationale the public is there to enact behaviour, enacting paternalistic 
decisions and must be often-u consciously ‘nudged’ to comply. Far from libertarian, the 
removal of choice could be said to demonstrate a government fear of ‘majoritarian 
democracy’ (Williams, 1958: 298); non-compliance is perceived as error in the system that 
must be corrected through communications or ‘nudging’. Raymond Williams observed that 
communication requires ‘not only transmission’, 
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it is also reception and response … The failure is due to an arrogant 
preoccupation with transmission, which rests on the assumption that the common 
answers have been found and need only to be applied (ibid: 314). 
 
The report justifies this, saying ‘changing the context, rather than people’s minds, might be 
more cost-effective’ (Dolan et. al., 2010: 16). Certainly a change to the ‘context’ of someone 
living in one of Britain’s most deprived communities, such as allocating funds to alleviate 
poverty, boost education, local job-creation and re-allocation of resources to create incentives 
for investment in that region, might be more likely to result in improvements in their lives, 
and decision-making, but systemic change is not what is meant.  
Many of those working in the field of ‘behavioural science’ have asserted that its 
incorporation into government has been too slow. Nigel Oakes, the CEO of contractor 
‘Strategic Communication Laboratories’ and founder of the ‘Behavioural Dynamics Institute’ 
(their research arm) said: ‘introducing ... influence and behavioural change into ... 
government organisations’ was a slow process ‘because up till now they’ve only ever 
understood ... attitudinal change and basically PR ... that’s what we’re up against. And, of 
course, hugely powerful people in government who specialise in’ PR (Oakes, 2013). This was 
echoed by O’Donnell: initially, ‘Comms people … were quite resistant … kind of old-
fashioned [believing] “what we need to do is to make an advert to tell people to put seatbelts 
on”’ (O’Donnell, 2014). And politicians’ views of this were traditional; ‘[pollsters] and focus 
groups’. This meant O’Donnell and Halpern were ‘a little bit nervous about this being seen as 
just another form of marketing’ (ibid.). 
 
O’Donnell chaired BIT’s quarterly boards which set the team’s strategic priorities until he 
retired and ‘Jeremy Heywood took over’, but Owain Service, the Deputy Director of the BIT 
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said that it had now became more ‘institutionalized’ (2013). Though it is a small team, 
O’Donnell noted that their function is to set things in motion and mentioned how DWP and 
HMRC ‘have been very good at picking up many of the ideas and taking forward themselves’ 
(2014). Their ‘interventions’ were designed to seek savings and efficiency and reduce 
government welfare spending. O’Donnell argued that ‘the whole point of behaviour change is 
to improve people’s wellbeing and the big society was an example of … using the fact that 
volunteering and giving are really positive for people’s wellbeing … leaving aside the 
advantage to those who are the recipients of it’ (ibid.). While many ‘nudges’ can be and are 
positive, in encouraging people to eat more healthily for example, or give up smoking, when 
they want do so, the ‘libertarian paternalism’ of behavioural economics, has been rolled out at 
a time when British welfare is being cut and the NHS privatized, and it exists as a way to 
facilitate these deepening cuts to services and greater deregulation.  
 
Owain Service said that the unit is misunderstood: ‘People think that … you’re trying to 
nudge people, actually what we’re really interested in is how people behave, the process and 
how we can help them to change their behaviour so that it’s more in line with what 
government objectives are’ (2013). The assertion from its Director Dr David Halpern was 
more in line with its accompanying spin; that the government unit was to ‘help people to 
make better choices for themselves’ (Benjamin, 2013); for whom they are making the choices 
is crucial. BIT priorities reflect the policy concerns of Prime Minister David Cameron and his 
Deputy Nick Clegg. They shifted after the initial focus and flurry of media coverage on 
health, ‘well-being’ and encouraging charity, to an enhanced focus on economic growth and 
generating revenue by reducing regulation and public spending. BIT effectively performed 
two key functions:  
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Ɣ As PR – presenting the government as an innovator in public health, social 
policy and welfare, austerity as necessary and ‘nudging’ as the only ‘realistic’ 
solution within the (silent and largely unchallenged) constraints of capitalism;  
 
Ɣ Within wider social policies supporting government cuts, by enabling 
government to refocus policy solutions away from the state, the financial 
sector and corporate tax avoidance.  
 
Service said that ‘a couple of days ago we had a steering board and [Jeremy Heywood] said I 
want you to work on employment and growth as your two priorities’ (2013). Such 
interventions have included a Job Centre in Loughton, Essex. Owain Service described how 
they use,  
 
user-centred design ... where you don’t assume you can dream up your policy 
from sitting behind a desk in Whitehall, you spend time observing; working with 
those people who are actually experiencing the service themselves. So you go to 
the users of a service or the administrators of a service (ibid.). 
 
They chose to go to the administrators of the service:  
 
a lot of that initial part of that particular programme was sitting in with job 
advisors when they themselves are going through the process of working with 
somebody who is looking for work. And the reason we emphasize this is, quite a 
lot of the time, if you are a policymaker in any country ... and you’re doing a ... 
programme around job centres you might go and visit a couple of job centres, but 
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you might not actually. But what you won’t do is spend a considerable period of 
time inside those job centres to really find out what it is truly like to be an 
administrator in a job centre. Or to be somebody who is looking for work (ibid.).6  
 
The intervention was designed to encourage advisors to give their clients a ‘sense of 
progress’, giving them a forward-looking focus on their plan rather than dwelling on the 
difficult realities of finding a job in the contemporary employment market. According to the 
Guardian, this formula is used in Starbucks reward schemes, marketing that gives customers 
‘a 12-stamp card, instead of a 10-stamp one, but when you buy your first coffee they give you 
two stamps straight off’ which means customers will feel a greater sense of ‘progress’ and 
buy more coffee (Benjamin, 2013). These marketing strategies are being applied to those in 
the lower strata of the British economy to ensure those individuals give more readily into the 
economy. Loughton is an area with high unemployment, hard hit by the recession (Epping 
Forest Guardian, 2008). In its suburb of Debden, this is compounded by mental health 
problems which are more prevalent than elsewhere in the country. A food bank which opened 
in 2012 was inundated in its first month, leading to strained resources (Hardy, 2012). 
 
BIT’s blog states proudly that they are ‘Designing interventions in partnership with the 
people who are going to deliver them’ but in doing this they leave out recipients of the 
intervention. Any intervention that is designed to respond to the needs and work in the 
interests of jobseekers needs to engage with jobseekers themselves, their individual needs and 
their experiences of the systems that have been targeted for change. This therefore, wasn’t a 
strategy designed around those who need most support such as the long-term unemployed 
and those who have come off incapacity benefit. BIT stated that they ‘don’t have data on 
                                               
6 They did not, however, interview anyone looking for work.  
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whether the customers had any disabilities’ (Cabinet Office, 2012a). The experiences of the 
jobseekers, their diverse situations and needs are irrelevant in the planning which was 
designed to reduce costs and paperwork at the department of Work and Pensions (DWP) 
(Cabinet Office, 2012b). The BIT boast a small increase of 15–20 per cent more people off 
benefits after thirteen weeks, possibly due to less of the jobseekers’ time being wasted on 
bureaucracy. While it is positive to reduce form-filling, if someone doesn’t have a job after 
eight weeks it is likely part of a broader problem such as a lack of suitable employment, a 
problem ‘expressive writing’ will not solve. The onus is of course on the jobseeker to become 
more ‘resilient’ not for the government to commit to ensuring secure employment is available 
(Cabinet Office, 2012a).  
 
A recent report by the ‘Resolution Foundation’ think-tank indicated recently that during the 
last six years, only London has seen a marked rise in employee jobs, and many of the 
increases seen nationally in those leaving welfare can be explained by a rise in often-
precarious self-employment (up to 15 per cent of all employment) with many becoming lone-
traders (D’Arcy and Gardiner, 2014). Other research by Manchester University shows that 
post-crisis growth and job-creation has been focused in the south-east (Chakrabortty, 2013). 
A significant proportion of the employee jobs that have been created have, however, been on 
insecure ‘zero-hours’ contracts where there is no minimum guarantee of working hours.  
 
Structured into some of the Mindspace framework is a focus on the poor for interventions. 
For example, it states ‘the value of something depends on where we see it from’; in other 
words, poor people need a smaller investment as an incentive to alter their behaviour. The 
poorer people are, the easier it is to motivate them with a lower financial incentive. The 
document describes how little was required to bring about a behaviour change in Malawi 
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(Dolan, et. al., 2010: 20). By the same rationale, with wealthy individuals, a financial 
incentive or cost is viewed according to the degree of change from that reference point. 
Recent research also indicates that the richer people get, the less empathy they have for those 
with less money and the more they defend their entitlement to that wealth. However, it has 
also been demonstrated that it is possible to ‘nudge’ such empathy with effects on wealth 
distribution. Psychologists (Piff, 2013a; 2013b), indicate that accumulating wealth decreases 
altruism and increases unethical behaviour, which drives up economic inequality. Yet Piff 
states that it is relatively easy to ‘nudge’ giving among the wealthy so that this decreases and 
‘cause wealthier individuals to be just as egalitarian as poor people’ (2013b). The majority of 
BIT changes, however, follow neo-liberal policies in predominantly focussing on ‘nudging’ 
ordinary individuals to pay more taxes etc., rather than nudging corporations or wealthy 
individuals to do so.7 Some research indicates that policymakers themselves and 
organizations may be subject to ‘behavioural biases’.8 Armstrong and Huck (2010) argue that 
these biases can potentially intervene in and modify corporate profit-maximising behaviours. 
 
In taxation, recent data by the Equality Trust advocacy group shows that the poorest 10 per 
cent of households already ‘pay eight percentage points more of their income in all taxes than 
the richest’, but the public perception is that the rich pay more (Allen, 2014). In 2011, the 
                                               
7 Corporate nudges are quite possible: Service mentioned one in relation to mobile phne theft that would 
impact on the market to produce a solution that would reduce the burden on policing: ‘the normal approach 
would be to say ... mobile phones get stolen all the time, how can we crack down on this particular problem? 
What powers can we give the police to solve this particular crime-type. And that might be a legitimate response, 
but ... it will cost money’. BIT instead created a Mobile Phone Theft Index: because, ‘for example ...iphones are 
about four times more likely to get stolen than the next most likely brand of phone, which are blackberries ... 
and there are peaks just before new model’s about to be introduced, which is an ... indication of the nature of 
some of this problem is ... an insurance issue...’ So the index would ‘gather the data on this and put it out so 
consumers can be more informed when they’re making their decisions, but more importantly, it will put pressure 
on the manufacturers in a slightly different way.’ (Service 2013). The motivation is not redistributive, but to 
adjust markets and reduce need for regulation of business. 
8
 On this O’Donnell said behavioural biases in government ‘absolutely’ exist and ‘a key point I’ve been making 
about politicians is that … Secretaries of State … spend a lot of time in the [House of Commons or Lords]’ and 
so ‘are automatically going to think that’s where I’m going to find the solution for things, hence you have a very 
strong bias towards legislative solutions.’ (O’Donnell 2014). 
22 
advocacy group Tax Justice Network estimated tax avoidance costs the UK economy £69.9 
billion a year (2011) and point out that this represents ‘56% of the country’s total healthcare 
spend’ (Jenner, 2011). The HMRC declares proudly that it has ‘more than 300 staff focused 
on’ affluent tax evaders (2012). This compares with 2,876 staff in 2012 at the DWP 
investigating social security fraud (Syal, 2012). BIT has also focused on tax, where Service 
said the techniques were ‘wildly successful’ (2013). Again, instead of focusing on the far 
more costly deliberate tax avoidance BIT focuses, for HMRC, on encouraging those who 
might be slow to pay more quickly. They state that they ‘brought forward an additional 
£210M of revenue’. It was ‘brought forward’ although ‘HMRC normally get the money at 
some point … [the taxpayers] pay you sooner so you don’t have to take them to court’ (ibid.). 
This strategy works by appealing to people’s honesty and is likely to affect only individuals 
who do their own taxes. Research has indicated that almost a third of managers polled 
recently said they work in an unethical way putting this down to necessity for ‘career 
progression’ (Chartered Management Institute, 2013: 4).  
 
A competitor, Nigel Oakes argued BIT’s methods were crude: ‘I think they’re looking at the 
economics of it and they’re then ... guessing at the solutions’, and 
  
picking up ... Robert Cialdini’s book Persuasion which covers ‘50 most useful 
techniques’ and they found one called social proof and so ... said to people in the 
street, everyone else has paid their gas bill so you should pay yours. 
 
Oakes said: ‘it’s like an ad agency ... coming up with a lucky ad campaign that sort of really, 
really works and they go, see?’ but not really understanding how and why they did it. One 
example he gave was their work on increasing gas bill payment saying this, ‘wasn’t bad... 
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because when you're dealing with ... hundreds of thousands of people ... pretty much 
whatever you do is going to ... achieve a positive result.’  
 
However, Oakes argued BIT was still better at ‘behaviour change’ than conventional PR. 
Increasingly this is seen as an area of expertize Britain can capitalize on and the BIT helped 
establish a similar unit in Obama’s White House. O’Donnell said ‘I suspect where the new 
version of the nudge unit will be most successful is in its work internationally with other 
governments’ (2014). The British Government has crafted an international image and 
reputation for being good at persuasion. In the US Government in particular, Britain is 
viewed as having particular skill in the area of persuasion, largely due to assistance in a 
security context (Briant, 2015). Assistant Head, Defence Media and Communications 
Operations Plans MoD Col. Ralph Arundell for example said ‘the Americans like to think 
we’re very good at this sort of activity. Because we have a long historical background with it’ 
(Briant, 2015: 216). In 2012 the New South Wales (NSW) Premier Barry O’Farrell set up a 
similar ‘nudge’ unit with BIT’s guidance. The plan was similar ‘looking at ways documents 
issued by the Office of State Revenue – which collects state taxes and traffic fines – can be 
reworded to deliver better results’ (Wade, 2013) and ‘debt recovery, fraud prevention and 
preventable health issues’ (Hollingworth, 2012). Chris Eccles, Director General of the NSW 
Department for Premier and Cabinet even echoed the same rhetoric used by Halpern: they 




BIT has now become a mutual, partnered with Nesta and is seeking more commercial 
contracts.9 British government departments will now pay consultancy fees for any advice 
provided. According to the Financial Times in 2013 ‘the value of government contracts 
handed to the private sector’ has ‘doubled in four years to £20bn’ (Plimmer, 2013). The move 
was not anticipated from the beginning: ‘I certainly hadn’t imagined that it would become a 
joint venture’ O’Donnell recalled, ‘that happened after my time’ (2014). O’Donnell himself 
now works for Frontier Economics, a consultancy which lobbies government ministers on 
behalf of commercial clients.10  
 
Media ‘Scapegoats’ and Individual Responsibility 
 
The cultural politics of neo-liberal ‘nudging’ – evidenced in discourse and persuasion tactics 
– can equally be evidenced in the way scapegoats emerge from media discourse in relation to 
the liberal notion of ‘individual responsibility’ across the cultural landscape. While BIT’s 
interventions fall far short of managing the impacts of austerity, some media have presented a 
selective or distorted history that deflects attention away from state responsibility.  
 
Gramsci saw the relationship between historical knowledge and praxis as crucial to ensuring 
philosophy and planning responds to the needs of the people (1971: 462) and that ‘consent’ is 
a clear indication of how the establishment attempt to manage the cultural political field. 
Media coverage has also helped to manage conflicts of interest and manufacture consent for 
austerity by demonizing the poor by creating moral panics, which are driven by ideology.  
 
                                               
9 These must have a ‘social purpose’ - Service clarified that this meant that the intervention cannot be for purely 
commercial objectives such as increasing profits (Service 2013). Beyond this, what kind of social purpose or 
who defines the social value of it is unclear.  
10
 Including Heathrow Airport which some have argued is a conflict of interests (Cohen, 2013) 
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As Cohen argued, moral panics are produced when ‘a condition, episode, person or group of 
persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests’ (2011: 9). 
Demonized ‘folk devils’ concerned ‘deviant youth cultures’, yet crucially key features of 
Cohen’s model in relation to the ‘cycle of a moral panic’ (ibid: 24), and ‘folk devils’, can be 
seen in recent contexts facilitating policy changes. Examples include disability and incapacity 
benefit claimants mentioned above.  
 
Emphasizing ‘individual responsibility’ isn’t particularly new, although in the age of austerity 
it clearly produces specific narratives that affect cultural politics. For example, Golding and 
Middleton had argued in the eighties that emphasizing individual responsibility led to a 
culture of ‘indicting welfare and convicting the poor’ for that era’s financial crisis (1982: 3), 
through the creation of new ‘folk devils’ in the media like ‘welfare scroungers’, ‘single 
mothers’ and ‘dole cheats’ (Cohen, 2011). Further the moral panic of a ‘campaign against 
scroungers’ (Franklin, 1999: 2) led to the demonization of welfare recipients, ignored the 
structural issue of rising unemployment (Campbell, 1984) and built intense pressure to cut 
back welfare spending. 
 
These historical details are replicated today when we consider the 2010 Coalition 
Government’s welfare reforms which included a reassessment of people claiming incapacity 
benefit11. Similar cuts to the austerity measures in 2010–1  had been proposed for incapacity 
benefit by the previous Blair Government in 2004–5. Research by Briant, Philo and Watson 
(2011) demonstrated a surge in media coverage of disability following the financial crash as 
                                               
11 The changes included tests for people who receive Employment Support Allowance (ESA) introduced by the 
previous administration and continued by the current one. A ‘Universal Credit’ benefit was introduced along 
with a change in indexation of uprating benefits from the higher Retail Price Index (RPI) to the lower Consumer 
Price Index (CPI), changes to entitlement to Disability Living Allowance (DLA) and a range of other service 
changes and welfare cuts impacting adversely on disabled people. 
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government cuts were directed at reducing the welfare budget by reclassifying disabled 
people as fit for work. This news coverage focused on people who it said claimed disability 
benefits fraudulently and linked them with the crisis through welfare spending.  
 
Although this type of news framing existed before the financial crash what is clear is the idea 
of ‘austerity’ – as ideology – helps to construct a different narrative within the field of 
cultural politics. For example the term, ‘we’re all in it together’, is an ideological construct 
that legitimizes government and often media actions to apply policy and to forward a 
philosophy that argues for individuals taking responsibility for their actions.   
 
Research indicates that mainstream reporting of the banking crisis forefronted City sources’ 
perspectives and proposed solutions which placed the burden on the public (Berry, 2012). As 
the cuts were underway in 2010–11 most newspapers were supportive of the government’s 
policies (Briant, Watson and Philo, 2013: 6) to justify the austerity cuts to disability benefits 
in the wake of the financial crisis where the media debate became more personalized around 
individual responsibility and less focused on ‘problems in the system’ (ibid.). Some articles 
even blamed the whole debt crisis on incapacity benefit claimants: ‘Shirker’s Paradise; 
Exclusive: IDS on Benefits Britain, Wagner’s one of Million who Claim Incapacity, Work-
shy are Largely to Blame for Deficit Crisis’ (Briant, Watson and Philo, 2013: 8). Negative 
coverage blamed welfare claimants themselves for austerity to deflect blame from 
government and created scapegoats for the cuts (Briant, Watson and Philo, 2011).  
 
The portrayal of the welfare claimants as fraudulent has been a central theme since the late 
1970s and research showed that the use of this theme increased following the financial crash 
(Briant, Watson and Philo, 2013). Deacon argued that in the 1970s media levels of hostility 
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towards the poor, contrasted with the existence of ‘virtually no abuse’ of the system (1978: 
346). And similarly following the financial crash an exaggerated prominence of fraud as a 
tabloid theme conflicted with the reality of low recorded and estimated levels of fraud (for 
Disability Living Allowance estimated to be at 0.5 per cent and for Incapacity Benefit to be at 
0.3 per cent by DWP 2012). It served to focus public perceptions on claimants rather than 
systemic problems of the labour market, or government economic policies. Exaggeration and 
distortion provide one way folk devils are constructed and reinforced (Cohen, 2011: 31). 
Cohen describes how individual cases are taken within the media discourse ‘as confirming a 
general theme’ (ibid: 81) and then seen as part of a broad trend, in this case it was benefit 
fraud. There is a strong public belief that benefit fraud is high; a recent poll indicates that ‘on 
average people think that 27 per cent of the welfare budget’ is fraudulently claimed – 
compared to the reality of just 0.7 per cent (TUC 2013). In fact, benefit underpayment is far 
greater than total benefit fraud, and both are far surpassed by even the modest HMRC 
estimates of tax avoidance, at £30 Billion per year (Ball, 2013). 
 
The fraud theme was reflected in language: benefit claimants were described by the media 
using pejorative terms such as ‘scrounger’ and ‘workshy’; terms that were used before the 
financial crash but which increased following it (Briant, Watson and Philo, 2013: 8). 
Politicians and ministers contributed to this, for example George Osborne, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer who ‘claimed living on incapacity benefit had become a “Lifestyle Choice”’; 
this phrase was ‘recycled’ in the media (ibid.). Cohen claimed that political influence plays a 
role in determining the form the ‘inventory’ or process of media interpretation/response 
takes; he identified two interrelated factors that determine this: ‘the institutionalised need to 
create news and [...] the selective and inferential structure of the news-making process’ 
(2011: 45). Cohen argues that ‘the media adjudicate between competing definitions of a 
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situation and these definitions are made in a hierarchical context – agents of social control are 
more likely to be believed’ (ibid: 46). Newspapers were broadly in support of the Coalitions 
welfare cuts and continued, as Cohen argued, selecting stories to fit with their pre-existing 
themes (ibid: 47).  
 
Following the financial crash there was also a redrawing of the category of ‘disabled’ by the 
Government distinguishing the undeserving (many) and the deserving (few) with an emphasis 
on ‘work’ capabilities rather than ‘health’. This allowed the vilification by government 
ministers and the mainstream media of ‘folk devils’ who had formerly been encouraged to 
claim. Those previously classified as disabled were now ‘described in the popular media and 
in political discourse as people who have taken illegitimately from the taxpayer and cheated 
“genuine” claimants’ (Briant, Watson and Philo, 2013; 14). It reduced claimants, whilst 
reassuring the public that support was provided for (those who continued to be classed as) 
disabled people and press coverage often included, as a minor theme, small concessions for 
the ‘genuine’ disabled which served to add emphasis to the idea of large numbers of 
‘fraudulent claimants’ (ibid: 10). The financial crisis thus facilitated the expansion of the neo-
liberal conceptualization of poverty as caused by ‘individual inadequacy’ and demanding 
individual not state solutions to include people in receipt of disability and incapacity benefits. 
News discourses were used to question the citizenship and rights of welfare recipients in a 




We have shown here how BIT’s ‘nudging’ is being used as a compliment to an ideological 
system which, alongside media creation of ‘folk devils’ refocuses responsibility for the 
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financial crisis and subsequent austerity measures on individuals. This exposes an inherent 
contradiction in the neo-liberal adherence to free market fundamentalism. Instead of being 
interpreted as a crisis for neo-liberal ideology, the 2008 financial crash was rationalized 
through a discourse of austerity that focused on reforming the behaviour of those most 
affected by the crash and this is how cultural politics proceeds in the age of austerity in the 
contexts discussed in this chapter. 
 
In his seminal work ‘The Sociological Imagination’, C. Wright Mills draws a distinction 
between ‘private troubles’ and ‘public issues’, he illustrates this idea by arguing that the 
solution to complex social problems like mass unemployment cannot be found ‘within the 
range of  opportunities open to any one individual’ (1959: 8). Mills stresses the importance of 
understanding the causal structural conditions that drive social problems. The individualist 
rationale that underpins the neo-liberal ideology represented in recent policy and media 
narratives inverts this logic to rationalize public issues as private troubles (Mills, 1959: 8). 
Briant, Watson and Philo (2013: 15) concluded that ‘The creation of widespread concern 
about fraud and misclaiming follows from deliberate political interventions’. Zizek describes 
how ‘pseudo concrete’ images are used to embody ‘all the evils of society’ and form part of 
an ‘ideological edifice’ to scapegoat individuals and groups. Zizek’s example of the 
‘unemployed single mother’ (2012) could just as easily be incapacity benefit claimants or 
other marginalized groups. Media representations have an impact on how poverty is 
understood by the public (Briant, Watson and Philo, 2011). Joseph Rowntree Foundation’s 
latest research found that public attitudes to poverty and welfare have hardened (Clery, Lee 
and Kunz, 2013). A fundamentalist free market approach has dominated political decisions 
about social welfare in Britain since the late 1970s, but is being further entrenched and 
justified with reference to the recent crisis. Social effects have been masked in an approach 
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which blames individuals for social problems and ignores the structural causes, leading the 
media to call for sanctions against those individuals. In these political and media narratives 
people are valued by their ‘ability to produce wealth’ (Katz, 1990: 7), justifying cuts and the 
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